After Lithuania declared a state-level emergency in December 2025, the European Commission also confirmed that such incidents are an expression of hybrid pressure. This is the new reality of European airspace security.
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At the same time, the drone threat, primarily caused by Russia, is becoming even more serious, fundamentally affecting the entire eastern NATO flank. For example, on May 29, a Russian drone attacking Ukraine crashed in the Romanian city of Galați, hitting a residential building and injuring two people. Romania confirmed that it was a Russian “Geran-2” type drone. These are real incidents occurring on the territory of the European Union and NATO. Lithuania is no exception in this case.
After unauthorized drones entered Lithuanian airspace, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, visiting Vilnius, emphasized that a threat to one member state is a threat to the entire Union. She also indicated that the EU is investing in anti-drone capabilities, advanced air defense, and critical infrastructure protection, with an additional 12 billion euros allocated to the Baltic states through the SAFE program. This is an important political message, identifying Baltic airspace security not as a regional but as a European problem.
I believe that in this situation, the most important thing is not to get lost in determining the origin of a specific object. Most likely, this is the result of navigation affected by Russian electronic warfare measures, possibly a deliberate test by third parties. The essence does not change: unauthorized flying objects reach the territory of the European Union.
This means a risk to civil aviation, residents, energy infrastructure, military facilities, and border protection. The European Union already has operational instruments. In February 2026, the European Commission presented the Drone and Anti-Drone Security Action Plan. It aims to strengthen member states’ preparedness, improve drone detection capabilities, coordinate responses, and enhance European defense readiness. The plan also foresees closer integration of government authorities, industry, and the innovation sector. This is the right direction, but now the most important thing is for the provisions of the documents to turn into real capabilities at the border.
One of the main projects should become the so-called European Drone Defense Initiative and the Eastern Flank Monitoring System. Commission documents foresee that this system will include air defense, anti-drone technologies, land and maritime security, situational awareness, electronic warfare, and operational coordination. It should operate closely coordinating actions with NATO structures. This is especially relevant for the Baltic countries, Poland, Romania, and the entire eastern EU border.
However, it is not always sensible to use expensive missiles. Ukraine has been living under drone warfare conditions daily for almost four years. Ukrainians have mastered fast, mobile, cheap, and technologically flexible solutions: from electronic warfare measures to mobile surveillance groups, from mass drone production to constant software updates. This is the changing reality of today.
When presenting the EU and Ukraine drone alliance, the European Commission itself acknowledges that stronger European drone and anti-drone capabilities must be developed based on Ukraine’s experience – combining scientific research, production, innovation, and scaling up. This is very important because Ukraine today is not only a recipient of support but also a European security innovator. Therefore, if we talk about a drone border, an anti-drone shield, or airspace protection in Europe, it is hard to do without the experience of Ukrainian experts, manufacturers, and soldiers.
Every solution tested in Ukraine that can protect a city, power substation, or airport must be evaluated in the context of European Union member states. It is worth mentioning that the European Union has already planned financial instruments in the defense sector for some time. For example, the SAFE program foresees up to 150 billion euros in loans to member states so they can rapidly increase defense investments through joint purchases. This could include anti-drone systems, radars, sensors, electronic warfare measures, mobile response units, and common regional airspace monitoring.
The European Parliament also plays an important role in security. In Parliament, we constantly raise issues regarding the protection of the EU’s external borders, hybrid threats, critical infrastructure security, and common anti-drone capabilities. We also urge the Commission to clearly define the goals, governance model, timelines, and funding of the European Drone Defense Initiative, Eastern Flank Monitoring, European Air Defense Shield, and Space Defense Shield. This is especially important because, according to the roadmap for European defense readiness by 2030, concrete capability projects must start as early as 2026, and by 2027 joint defense purchases should account for 40% of all procurements.
Such a decision should ease the financial burden on individual member states. In the already adopted resolution on drones and new warfare systems, Parliament clearly emphasized that Europe must adapt to today’s security challenges, strengthen drone and anti-drone capabilities, and invest in detection, tracking, electronic warfare, and neutralization technologies. Next comes the practical implementation of these political provisions: committee discussions, budget priority coordination, strengthening the European defense industry, and possible additional resolutions on protecting the EU’s eastern flank.
It is especially important that according to the roadmap for European defense readiness by 2030, initial capabilities of the European Drone Defense Initiative and Eastern Flank Monitoring are to be achieved by the end of 2026. This means that this year it should become clear how the common European drone detection and neutralization system will be created, how it will be coordinated with air defense, border protection, space technologies, and NATO capabilities. It is obvious that Russia and the Belarusian regime have been testing Europe’s resilience limits for years. Only the methods differ.
Sometimes this is done by instrumentalizing migrants, other times by balloons, thirdly by drones, and fourthly by disinformation. Our response must be comprehensive. The European Union must protect its airspace and respond proactively to possible incidents. Today, airspace security starts not only with fighters or large anti-aircraft defense systems. It starts with the ability to timely detect a small, cheap, but dangerous drone. And recent events have shown that security in the Baltic countries within the European Union is certainly not a peripheral issue – it is a matter of security for all Europe.
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