While negotiations continue, it has been decided not to change the current Russian oil price cap of 44.10 USD per barrel at least until July 23. Another, and possibly the last attempt before the summer break, to reach an agreement is scheduled for July 22 at the meeting of the Committee of Permanent Representatives – COREPER. It is worth mentioning that a separate sanctions package was already adopted on June 15.
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It included 34 individuals and 47 companies and organizations related to the Russian military industry, the so-called shadow fleet, propaganda, repression, and human rights violations. However, the EU Council itself clearly stated that this is not the 21st package and that work on a broader sanctions package continues. The last fully adopted sanctions package in the official chronology remains the 20th, approved in April. The initial draft of the 21st package submitted by the European Commission on June 9 was indeed ambitious.
It proposed to stop the automatic increase of the Russian oil price cap, sanction another 30 ships of the Russian shadow fleet, and for the first time apply measures to ships servicing, supplying fuel, or providing other services to them. It also planned to sanction ports, airports, oil refineries, and traders that help Russia maintain energy revenues.
In the financial sector, the Commission proposed banning transactions with another 31 Russian banks and 20 banks operating in third countries, cryptocurrency platforms, and oil traders. The package also included new export restrictions on metals, alloys, drone equipment, launch and electronic jamming systems. For the first time, serious measures were proposed against Russian fisheries, including a complete ban on the import of certain products, such as cod. It was also proposed to restrict the entry of former Russian soldiers who participated in the war against Ukraine into the European Union.
However, much less remains from the initial draft to the current compromise. Currently, the main unresolved obstacles are the demands of Greece and Austria. Greece seeks to allow its shipping companies to continue transporting and re-exporting Russian liquefied natural gas to third countries. Shipping has historically had exceptional importance in the Greek economy, so Athens views all decisions regarding tankers, insurance, and maritime services very sensitively.
Austria, in turn, seeks a solution that would help “Raiffeisen Bank International” compensate for losses awarded by Russian courts. One of the options under consideration is related to the frozen assets of the Russian investment company “Rasperia.” However, allowing sanctioned assets to be used as compensation to a Western bank would create an unprecedented precedent: Moscow would only need to confiscate European companies’ assets in Russian courts to later pressure the EU to release frozen Russian assets here.
A separate and very unpleasant compromise has already been made regarding Moscow Patriarch Kirill. At Bulgaria’s request, supported by Italy, he was removed from the proposed sanctions list. Also removed was “Lukoil” founder Vagit Alekperov. Bulgaria based its position not only on the country’s economic interests related to the Burgas oil refinery but also on the historical and religious ties between Bulgaria and Russia. Nevertheless, the removal of Patriarch Kirill is a very negative event.
We are talking about a person who consistently legitimizes aggression against Ukraine with his religious authority. The structures he leads describe the war against Ukraine as “holy” in their documents, and Ukraine itself is presented as part of the alleged “Russian world” space. If propagandists, military industry leaders, and war recruiters are sanctioned, why should an exception be made for a person spreading propaganda in religious language?
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On the contrary, Kirill’s role is particularly dangerous because it gives the war an alleged moral and sacred meaning. The proposal to ban Russian soldiers from entering the EU was also weakened. After objections from France, Italy, Greece, Cyprus, and other countries, the automatic ban on all former Russian soldiers was abandoned. I also view this step very critically, as it allows people who potentially committed direct war crimes in Ukraine to travel freely across Europe without any legal consequences.
It is likely that this measure will apply to a narrower circle of individuals and mostly in cases of short-term visas. Fish import restrictions are also being eased because Germany, Poland, Portugal, France, and the Netherlands seek to protect their food processing sectors. Greece, Malta, and Cyprus are pressing to reduce restrictions on shipping and the transport of Russian LNG. Therefore, it is clear that this sanctions package aims to find many compromises that weaken the potential impact of the sanctions. However, it must be acknowledged that the main direction of the 21st sanctions package remains.
It still envisages increasing pressure on Russia’s energy revenues, additional restrictions on the shadow fleet and ships servicing it, sanctions on banks, cryptocurrency platforms, and traders helping to circumvent restrictions. Stricter export controls on military and dual-use equipment also remain. Therefore, despite difficult negotiations, the package can still become a significant step in reducing the Kremlin’s ability to finance the war against Ukraine.
My colleagues and I in the European Parliament (EP) constantly support tightening existing sanctions on Russia, especially in the energy sector. For example, on February 24, 2026, the EP called for increasing sanctions on Russia, preventing their circumvention, and finally abandoning dependence on Russian oil, gas, uranium, nuclear fuel, and other energy resources. The essential goal must remain a complete embargo on Russian coal, oil, and gas.
Since the beginning of Russia’s aggression in 2022, one of the main political goals has been the absolute rejection of Russian fossil fuels. Also important is the EU’s strict stance towards third countries that buy oil from Russia. After all, importing countries like India and China not only finance the Kremlin by buying Russian oil but also help Russia circumvent sanctions. I have repeatedly emphasized during debates that the number of sanctions packages is not an end in itself – the most important thing is their impact, enforcement, and closing the ways to circumvent sanctions.
If a compromise is not found at the last COREPER meeting before the summer break, the entire package may be postponed until autumn. And Russia will not wait during that time; it will continue selling energy resources, using the shadow fleet, looking for new banks and cryptocurrency platforms, and producing rockets and drones with the income received. And Europe, as always, acts seeking compromise. But the impact of sanctions must genuinely reduce Russia’s ability to continue the war, or else the number 21 of the package will remain just a number.
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